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Abstract 
In today’s business environment, the trend towards more product variety and customization is unbroken. Due to this development, the need of 
agile and reconfigurable production systems emerged to cope with various products and product families. To design and optimize production
systems as well as to choose the optimal product matches, product analysis methods are needed. Indeed, most of the known methods aim to 
analyze a product or one product family on the physical level. Different product families, however, may differ largely in terms of the number and 
nature of components. This fact impedes an efficient comparison and choice of appropriate product family combinations for the production
system. A new methodology is proposed to analyze existing products in view of their functional and physical architecture. The aim is to cluster
these products in new assembly oriented product families for the optimization of existing assembly lines and the creation of future reconfigurable 
assembly systems. Based on Datum Flow Chain, the physical structure of the products is analyzed. Functional subassemblies are identified, and 
a functional analysis is performed. Moreover, a hybrid functional and physical architecture graph (HyFPAG) is the output which depicts the 
similarity between product families by providing design support to both, production system planners and product designers. An illustrative
example of a nail-clipper is used to explain the proposed methodology. An industrial case study on two product families of steering columns of 
thyssenkrupp Presta France is then carried out to give a first industrial evaluation of the proposed approach. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the 28th CIRP Design Conference 2018. 
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1. Introduction 
Due to the fast development in the domain of 
communication and an ongoing trend of digitization and
digitalization, manufacturing enterprises are facing important
challenges in today’s market environments: a continuing
tendency towards reduction of product development times and
shortened product lifecycles. In addition, there is an increasing
demand of customization, being at the same time in a global 
competition with competitors all over the world. This trend, 
which is inducing the development from macro to micro 
markets, results in diminished lot sizes due to augmenting
product varieties (high-volume to low-volume production) [1]. 
To cope with this augmenting variety as well as to be able to
identify possible optimization potentials in the existing
production system, it is important to have a precise knowledge
of the product range and characteristics manufactured and/or 
assembled in this system. In this context, the main challenge in
modelling and analysis is now not only to cope with single 
products, a limited product range or existing product families,
but also to be able to analyze and to compare products to define
new product families. It can be observed that classical existing
product families are regrouped in function of clients or features.
However, assembly oriented product families are hardly to find. 
On the product family level, products differ mainly in two
main characteristics: (i) the number of components and (ii) the
type of components (e.g. mechanical, electrical, electronical). 
Classical methodologies considering mainly single products 
or solitary, already existing product families analyze the
product structure on a physical level (components level) which 
causes difficulties regarding an efficient definition and
comparison of different product families. Addressing this 
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Abstract 
This conceptual paper discusses the application of game theory to Product Service System (PSS) research by highlighting the pros and cons in 
game theory in treating various aspects of PSS. To this end, we first describe the basic formulation in game theory, its usefulness and 
limitations and its potential applications in PSS. We then propose some ways of modeling three types of PSS: product-oriented PSS, use-
oriented PSS, and result-oriented PSS using the game theory framework. Three studies that authors have so far conducted are presented as case 
examples: (1) a case addressing a member-type PSS, (2) a case of product lease service, and (3) a case of platform businesses. We explain how 
to apply our proposed modeling methods in the aforementioned cases.   
 
 
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the 10th CIRP Conference on Industrial Product-Service Systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Some manufacturers are now expanding their business 
focus from a conventional product selling to offering Product 
Service Systems (PSS). Although there are many reasons for 
that, one is due to the changes in customer needs and the ever-
increasing competition. In the past, product ownership alone 
would satisfy customer needs, but nowadays both products 
and services are more desirable [1]. Another reason stems 
from the fact that technology development has been a
contributing factor to profitability. However, because the 
current technology has been well develop d, it will become 
mor  difficult to fully diffe en iate p ducts in the market a d 
gain the competitiveness based on the technological aspects 
alon . Therefore, differentiation by service, th t s, service 
innovati n, i  somehow esse tial [2]. In addition, pressures
from Circular Economy (CE) add anot er c mpelling reason
for t e h ft [3][4]. PSS is r cognized as a key enabler of CE
as it contribu es to the use of ess material as the products 
being circulat d.  
PSS is defined by Goedkoop et al. [5] as  
 
“… a system of products, services, networks of ‘players’ 
and supporting infrastructure that continuously strives 
to be competitive, satisfy customer needs and have a 
lower environmental impact than traditional business 
models.” 
 
Sinc  PSS re earch is yet t  fully mature, despite the 
numerous studies (see revie  of PSS [6][7], for example),
there are only a small number of papers adopting the game 
theory  model PSS. Whe  considering service aspects, 
human factors are inevit bly included and, we believ , game 
theory c n appropriately deal with issues of human d cision-
makings.  
In is c nceptual pap r, we discuss the appl cability of 
g me theory to describe various issues in PSS and propos  
several ways of modeling PSS using the game theory 
approach. In the next s cti , w  will first explain a game 
theory formulation and discuss its advantages and limitations. 
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Section 3 proposes the ways in which game theory can model 
the three types of PSS proposed by Tukker [8]. Section 4 
gives some examples of game theoretic PSS studies. The 
paper concludes in Section 5, describing our lessons learnt 
and possible way forward in terms of research direction. 
 
2. Game theoretic framework and Product Service 
Systems  
This section discusses the application of game theory to 
PSS. First, we will explain how game theory generally 
formulates a decision-making situation. Second, we will 
describe its scope. After that, we will discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of game theory in the context of PSS.  
2.1. A general formulation by game theory 
Game theory generally provides a framework of theoretical 
description about decision-making where multiple players are 
involved and have interdependent relations. For example, the 
normal form game, which is the simplest formulation, is 
composed of the following three elements：  
• Player 
is an entity that makes decisions. It can be an individual 
like a consumer or an investor, and can also be an 
organization like a company, a group, a club, or a party; 
furthermore, a government or nation can be included. A 
large variety of entities can be expressed. Player’s set is 
generally defined as 𝑁𝑁 = {1, 2, … , 𝑛𝑛}.  
• Strategy  
generally represents an action or action plan to play a game. 
Each player takes some action or action plan and then its 
outcome is determined. Letting 𝑠𝑠+ be a player 𝑖𝑖’s strategy, 
𝑠𝑠 = (𝑠𝑠.,⋯ , 𝑠𝑠0) is called a strategy profile. A set of player 
𝑖𝑖’s strategies is defined as 𝑆𝑆+. 
• Payoff 
is a numerical expression of preference order over 
outcomes. Each player respectively has a different payoff 
function and it is generally defined as a payoff function, 
𝑓𝑓+: 𝑆𝑆 → ℝ, where 𝑆𝑆 is a set of strategy profiles and defined 
as 𝑆𝑆 ≡ 𝑆𝑆.×𝑆𝑆9 ⋯ 𝑆𝑆0. 
Accordingly, a normal form game is generally formulated 
as Γ =< 𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆+ +∈=, 𝑓𝑓+ +∈= >. When 𝑁𝑁 , 𝑆𝑆+ , and 𝑓𝑓+  are set as 
actual values/functions, it can express a certain concrete 
decision-making situation. As another form, game theory 
generally uses an extensive form game, where a game tree is 
used for expressing a game situation. Due to limitations of 
space, the detail formulation on extensive form game is not 
included.  
2.2. Scope of game theory 
As seen in section 2.1, a game theoretic framework is 
generally simplified and considers a situation where players 
choose actions from among predetermined alternatives. 
Thereby, various aspects are eliminated and abstracted. In 
addition, unrealistic extreme assumptions such as perfect 
rationality and complete information are imposed.  
On the one hand, such an abstraction might be unrealistic, 
but on the other hand it can treat a broader scope of situations. 
This can be argued as the strength of game theory. Within 
such an abstracted description, game theory tries to derive its 
theoretical equilibrium and to understand the mechanism 
about its decision-making situation.  
Among various equilibrium concepts, Nash equilibrium is 
the most basic one, which is defined as:  
In n-person normal form game, 𝑠𝑠∗ = (𝑠𝑠.∗, 𝑠𝑠9∗, … 𝑠𝑠0∗) is 
called Nash equilibrium if for all 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 and for all 𝑠𝑠+ ∈
𝑆𝑆+,  𝑓𝑓+(𝑠𝑠∗) ≥ 𝑓𝑓+(𝑠𝑠+, 𝑠𝑠A+∗ ).  
Herein, 𝑠𝑠A+  stands for a strategy profile except player 𝑖𝑖 ’s 
strategy, that is, 𝑠𝑠A+ = (𝑠𝑠.,⋯ 𝑠𝑠+A., 𝑠𝑠+B.,⋯ 𝑠𝑠0) . Roughly 
speaking, the meaning of Nash equilibrium state is that each 
player takes own payoff-maximizing action and has no 
deviation from the state.  
By deriving Nash equilibrium, we can expect the state to 
be attained under rationality. Because people in reality do not 
necessarily take rational action or behave selfishly, the 
equilibrium state might sound meaningless. However, it can 
be regarded as being a consistent state in terms of incentive 
structure, so it shows a potential to act as a theoretical 
benchmark in considering a PSS structure.  
In summary, the game theory indeed focuses on an abstract 
situation, but because from incentive point of view, game 
theory can clarify the fundamental mechanism behind them, it 
can be applied to model various issues in PSS.   
2.3. Usefulness of game theory and its limitations 
Game theory provides us a clear description of situations, 
so that it enables us to understand its theoretical structure. In 
addition, as mentioned in section 2.2, we can consider an 
issue of PSS as an incentive structure. Hereby we summarize 
its usefulness and/or advantages and limitations by separating 
them into the following subcategories.   
2.3.1. Expression of player’s preference prescribed by payoff 
function 
In general, a payoff function is also called a utility function, 
and it defines preference that a player has. For a payoff 
function, a real number function is usually used, meaning that 
if a payoff value at a certain outcome is larger than that at 
another outcome, it denotes that the outcome with higher 
payoff is preferable. In general, preference is subjective and 
what people have in mind, so that it is difficult to define 
objectively. In game theory, however, a researcher assumes an 
imaginary person with a certain payoff function and 
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accordingly defines preference compulsorily. Although this 
manipulation might sound unrealistic, it has strength in a 
scientific sense. This is because under a given preference, the 
structure of decision-making can be objectively demonstrated. 
This point is a very scientific approach.  
On the other hand, such a deterministic way of describing 
preference would be one of the limitations of game theory. In 
the theory, preference is not changeable and is consistent over 
time. It is quite different from preference in a realistic sense. 
This is because it stems from axioms in preference: reflexivity, 
transitivity, and completeness. In the framework of decision 
theory, one think that those axioms are undoubtedly true 
without any proof. While this is powerful in some respect, it 
can be a weakness considering how much a real situation can 
be modelled directly.  
Because human aspects to a large extent are included in 
PSS, the effectiveness of PSS can strongly depend on user’s 
preference. In this sense, such a deterministic preference 
assumption is useful when researchers analyze how PSS 
works from a scientific point of view. In other words, it means 
that a researcher can concentrate on elucidating the 
mechanism of PSS under a situation that various types of 
preference are given.  
2.3.2. Equilibrium concepts 
As already mentioned in section 2.2, equilibrium analysis 
is a major method to understand situations modelled by game 
theory. This can be an advantage because it can give us a clear 
understanding and insights. Since equilibrium is only a static 
state, it is not appropriate to analyse the dynamic process to 
reach the equilibrium. In general, game theory does not 
consider how people behave until the equilibrium point is 
reached. In case of applying to PSS studies, researchers must 
be aware of this point.  
Nash equilibrium is composed under some sort of specific 
theoretical world. Therefore, as unreality is often criticised, it 
cannot represent the real world. Even in the world of physics, 
the same thing would be true. In physics, one solve a motion 
equation and understand its dynamics: for example, an object 
flies with an ideal parabolic line being drawn. However, in 
reality, due to air resistance, an object does not fly through an 
ideal parabolic line. Similarly, Nash equilibrium in game 
theory is an ideal state, so it is natural that it does not 
perfectly represent the real world. Therefore, such a way of 
thinking can be applied in the case of PSS studies.  
2.3.3. Expression of Outcome 
A result of game is represented as a form of outcome, 
which is a resultant state after all players have made their 
decisions. Mathematically, it is a vector of actions taken by 
players or a vector of payoffs that corresponds to actions 
taken by them. In terms of objective expression, it would 
become an advantage. A vector of actions can mean an 
observable state in PSS, so it is understandable and tractable.  
However, such an expression does not have enough 
freedom and it would be insufficient to express a complicated 
PSS.  
2.3.4. Treatment of information structure 
In game theory, information is treated in a well-organized 
manner, e.g. (im)perfect information, (in)complete 
information, information set, common knowledge, private 
information, etc., but most of them are simplified to fit a 
mathematical formulation. In PSS, complex information 
structure is needed. Thus, although mathematically sound, 
game theory has limitations in treatment of complex 
information structure.  
2.3.5. Incorporation of probabilistic events  
Game theory is strong in dealing with probabilistic events. 
For example, player’s strategy can be expressed by 
probability, which is called mixed strategy and can be a 
theoretical base. In addition, a probabilistic decision, which is 
called nature’s move, is represented as a special node in a 
game tree: the node is not attributed by any player and its 
decision is determined simply by probability. Moreover, since 
a base of game theory is expected utility, probability is 
intrinsically a part of game theory.  
In addition, game theory provides a framework of 
Bayesian game which can treat a situation with incomplete 
information. Usually, private information like a type is used 
and a type is distributed with some probability. Letting his/her 
own type be an observation, Bayes probability of other 
player’s type can be calculated. With the posterior probability, 
the expected payoff can be determined and then Nash 
equilibrium can be derived. This is called Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium. Even if such a probabilistic situation is 
introduced, game theory can manipulate decision-making 
situations well.  
In PSS studies, it is necessary to model a PSS structure as a 
probabilistic event in some cases. Game theory approach will 
therefore be useful in this respect.  
 
3. Ways of modeling PSS with game theoretical approach 
This section discusses how three types of PSS [8] (product 
oriented PSS, use-oriented PSS, and result-oriented PSS) can 
be modelled in game theoretic framework.   
3.1. Product-oriented PSS 
According to Tukker [8], product-oriented PSS is the one 
whereby:  
 
“… the provider not only sells a product, but also offers 
services that are needed during the use phase of the 
product”. 
 
This situation can thus be regarded as a contract between the 
provider and its customers, so that such a situation can be 
modelled as a contractual decision-making among players in 
game theory. However, after the contract is signed, some sort 
of service process during the use phase is provided. It means 
that expected/unexpected events will occur after the contract, 
so that a sequential game like Fig. 1 is appropriate, where a 
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contract decision is represented by a node and then some 
events in use phase continue as subsequent nodes.  
Consider a maintenance contract, for example. Here we are 
uncertain when a product will fail, meaning an element of risk 
needs to be included. In that case, probabilistic events may be 
incorporated into the model. In game theory, generally, such a 
probabilistic event can be described as a nature’s move. 
Especially in case of product failure, its rate can be 
approached using some probabilistic distribution and it is 
relatively easy to incorporate such a probabilistic event 
because game theory can treat decision making with 
probability.  
 
 
Fig. 1. A modelling way of product-oriented PSS with game theory. 
3.2. Use-oriented PSS 
In general, product lease or sharing is applicable to this 
type of PSS. One of the characteristics in this PSS type is that 
the provider owns the products [8] and only product 
functionality is sold to the customers. In the game theoretical 
framework, this situation can be described as a decision on the 
how long to use the function of a product for, e.g. how many 
hours a car is being rented out. Even if a player’s decision 
variable is of a continuous value, a game theoretical 
framework works well, although it is often assumed that a set 
of possible actions that a player can take is a finite set. If a set 
of actions is infinite, the existence of Nash equilibrium cannot 
be theoretically assured [9].  
To model this situation, we propose an idea of willingness-
to-pay per hour (WTP/h) or per other unit time. The term 
WTP (often used in economics) explains how much a player is 
willing to purchase the product at most. On the other hand, in 
case of WTP/h, the same idea is applied to service situation. 
So WTP/h means an amount of money that a player is willing 
to pay for a service in one hour. Nonetheless, in reality, 
WTP/h is decreasing as time goes by (Fig. 2). For example, if 
considering a case that you want to rent a car for 5 hours, you 
would feel another hour after 5 hours past is less important 
because 5 hours are enough. It means WTP/h for an hour from 
4 to 5 hour use is higher than that from 5 to 6 hour use as 
shown in Fig.2.  
To consider the use-oriented PSS in a game theoretical 
framework, the idea of WTP/h should be reflected in the 
payoff functions.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Decreasing willingness-to-pay per hour. 
3.3. Result-oriented PSS 
As discussed in section 2.3, game theory uses a form of 
outcome, wherein all player’s actions are described as a 
vector. Also, in game theory, an outcome means a resultant 
state after all players took respective actions. It can be also 
regarded as a state where all services have completely been 
provided. Tukker [8] used the outsourced service as an 
example of this type of PSS. So, a form of outcome is 
appropriate to the result-oriented PSS, as a state after service 
was completed, is the primary concern. A game theoretical 
framework can directly be used in this PSS but a model 
should include a description how the service precisely fulfils 
the required quality or specifications.  
A remarkable difference from the modelling of product-
oriented PSS is that risk is not included. For example, in case 
of maintenance contract scheme as a product-oriented PSS, it 
is not certain when a product will fail and to what extent. So 
this is a risk. On the other hand, in an example of outsourced 
service as the result-oriented PSS, all process is outsourced, 
so that the provider will bear all the risks. A qualified result 
only is provided with users in this result-oriented PSS.   
3.4. Summarizing ways of modelling PSS  
In section 3, we have so far discussed how to model the 
three types of, although when modelling them using the game 
theoretic framework, it would be difficult to clearly treat them 
as distinct types, and thus, a combined way of three modeling 
types would be required. It is also important that by observing 
PSS in reality, the situation can be simplified and abstracted 
into a game theoretic situation.  
 
4. Case examples 
This section presents several examples where we apply 
game theory to service-related issues. The first one is a study 
addressing the member-type PSS [10][11]; the second one is a 
case of product lease service [12]; and the third one is the 
platform business [13][14].  
…
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contract decision
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4.1. Membership-type service 
In our previous studies [10][11], membership-type service 
has been modelled using the game theory approach. Herein, 
the decision-making processes between a service provider and 
service receivers are addressed. Fig. 3 depicts an overview of 
the model. While a membership service is provided by the 
service provider, the service receivers join the group members 
and enjoy services. If the service receivers join the group 
members, then they are able to use the services at discounted 
prices as a membership privilege. Even if receivers do not join, 
they can use services at a normal price. This study, in addition 
to Nash equilibrium analysis, used multi-agent simulation and 
human subject experiments and compared performances 
between complete and incomplete information cases.  
The way to model PSS as described in section 3.1 will be 
applied here. As shown in the figure, service receivers make 
decision of joining membership; and after that, they decide 
whether to use a service repeatedly. The structure is the same 
as a contract case explained in section 3.1.  
This model is, indeed, simplified but can be applicable to 
several PSS cases in reality. For example, sports clubs and 
reward programs share this type of structure.  
 
 
Fig. 3. An overview of membership-type service (Source: [10]) 
4.2. Product lease service 
As an extension to the above case, a product leasing service 
model is hereby constructed [12]. In the model, a 
manufacturer decides a service price per unit time and product 
functionality level of a product. Each consumer makes own 
decision whether to use this service and, if so, for how long. 
The customer decides the duration of product use. The 
consumer’s willingness-to-pay was defined as shown in Fig. 4. 
Especially in this study, a main target was to clarify conditions 
that product lease service is more profitable than a product 
selling case by deriving the Nash equilibrium.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Definition of willingness-to-pay in car sharing model (Source: [12]) 
The formulation of willingness-to-pay in the model is in 
accordance with a modeling of use-oriented PSS mentioned in 
section 3.2. A decreasing function presented in Fig. 4 is used 
to express WTP per time unit. Thereby, consumer’s payoff 
function is defined as  
𝑓𝑓+ = 𝑟𝑟 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝	𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡IJK , 
where 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑝𝑝 stand for WTP per unit time and service price, 
respectively.  
This type of modeling ways is widely applicable to various 
situation of PSS. A point here is to introduce the idea of WTP 
per unit time. It could widen the area that game theory can 
address in PSS modelling.  
4.3. Platform-business 
Our last case [13][14] is a model of platform-type business, 
which includes players of four kinds: content developers, the 
platform provider, the device manufacturer, and consumers. 
The content developers produce some content that constitutes 
service components and which cannot work per se. The device 
manufacturer produces some devices on which the contents 
work, representing the product components. The platform 
provider provides a sort of a platform which connects the 
device and the contents, e.g. interfaces for microprocessors, 
operating systems for PCs, a unified standard, etc. 
Accordingly, the platform provider issues licenses to content 
developers or the device manufacturer. Each player’s decision 
and product flow are depicted in Fig. 5. 
In the formulation of this model, an outcome is described 
as the decision that consumers make about what device and 
contents to purchase, implying that this model adapts a 
modelling of result-oriented PSS explained in section 3.3. 
However, the use phase on the platform is an important aspect 
in reality, e.g. how users consume contents on the platform, 
how they interact with manufacturers and/or other users, etc. 
Therefore, a combined modelling of product-oriented and use-
oriented PSS would also be essential. The studies [13][14] do 
not address such aspects but it shall be considered as future 
work.   
 
W
illi
ng
ne
ss
-to
-p
ay
 
pe
r t
im
e 
un
it
 Nariaki Nishino et al. / Procedia CIRP 73 (2018) 304–309 309
6 Author name / Procedia CIRP 00 (2018) 000–000 
 
Fig. 5. A basic model framework of platform PSS structure (Source: [13]) 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
This article discussed the potential applications of game 
theory to PSS. From a theoretical point of view, its usefulness 
can be demonstrated. However, there exists an open issue, 
which is about “co-creation”. In PSS, it is often said that co-
creation should be a key for success [15]. Such a co-creation 
can be realized through dynamic interactions amongst 
stakeholders. Game theory, however, defines a mathematical 
framework in a definite manner and therefore it does not 
directly address dynamic interactions that co-creation 
essentially has. Nonetheless, game theory showed a potential 
contribution in constructing some sort of theoretical 
benchmark about co-creation. In addition, the idea of 
functional products [16] fits well into an expression of 
equilibrium, so that has a possibility to discuss co-creation in 
terms of game theory. We need to consider ways of addressing 
this aspect of co-creation, including practical ways of 
experimenting with such a model [17], particularly from a 
game theoretic point of view.  
To our knowledge, despite the numerous studies in 
modelling PSS, e.g. [18], the application of game theory in 
PSS appears to be scarce. As PSS incorporates the element of 
human factors, game theory can be useful. We have discussed 
the strengths and the weaknesses of game theory and we have 
also discussed its applicability. Based on the discussion, 
several ways of using game theory to model PSS have been 
proposed in this paper. The first is applied to product-oriented 
PSS, where the importance of the description of contract in a 
game theoretical framework has been demonstrated. The 
second is applied to model the use-oriented PSS. For that, we 
argue that it is necessary to consider the idea of WTP per unit 
time. Finally, the third is applied to model the result-oriented 
PSS, in which the conventional game theoretic way of 
modelling can be applicable.  
To conclude, game theory adopts a simplified and 
abstracted form of description, and it can be one of the 
worthwhile tools that can help understand many types of 
decision-making situations, especially in PSS. We hope to see 
the growth of PSS work using game theory in the near future.  
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